CrashExploitFixer
The mod currently patches three different exploits for all affected Minecraft versions from 1.14.4 to Latest!
Entity Selector NBT Stack Overflow
A stack overflow vulnerability in Minecraft versions 1.14.4 through the latest release at the time of writing allows
attackers to crash servers by abusing deeply nested NBT data inside entity selectors, causing recursive parsing in
TagParser to exhaust the JVM stack. While Minecraft 1.21.1 prevents unprivileged players from triggering the
issue through entity selectors, operators and creative-mode players can still reproduce the crash on unpatched servers.
Notably, PaperMC discovered and patched the underlying parser issue months earlier.
Blogpost from haykam: haykam.com
Excessive Network Object Allocation
A denial-of-service vulnerability affecting Minecraft networking allowed authenticated players to crash servers by
sending malicious packets that triggered excessive memory allocation during collection deserialization through
FriendlyByteBuf.readCollection, FriendlyByteBuf.readMap, or related methods. While the issue was exploitable
through a Fabric API packet and likely many modded packets across different loaders, NeoForge and Fabric patched the
issue for their most active versions (NeoForge: 1.21.1 and 26.1, Fabric: 1.20.1, 1.21.1, 1.21.11, 26.1, 26.2).
CrashExploitFixer patches the issue for all versions of Forge, NeoForge, and Fabric and is compatible with their fixes.
Many thanks to Paul for reporting this in private
Blogpost from NeoForge: neoforged.net
Translatable Component Expansion
A denial-of-service vulnerability affecting Minecraft 1.16 through 1.21.4 allowed attackers to craft recursively
expanding text components that could inflate into enormous strings during parsing, flattening, or calls such as
Component#getString(), leading to severe memory exhaustion and client or server soft-crashes. Newer research showed
that specially constructed hover-event payloads could trigger the issue without elevated permissions in vanilla
1.20.5–1.21.4. PaperMC had already protected against
this class of exploit for years, while modded environments remain especially vulnerable due to widespread use of
FriendlyByteBuf#readComponent() and related component deserialization paths in network packets.
Many thanks to Paul for reporting this in private
